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The Malthusian Trap and Development in Pre-Industrial Societies: A View 
Differing from the Standard One 
ABSTRACT 
Presents a simple economic theory explaining how some agriculturally based preindustrial 
societies (for example, in the Neolithic period) developed despite most of their population 
being subject to Malthusian dynamics. Their development depended on a dominant class 
(limited in size) extracting the economic surplus which could be used (among other things) to 
accumulate capital and advance knowledge and thereby, add to this surplus. Cities facilitated 
this process. Extraction of the surplus prevented increased population from dissipating it and 
curtailing development. Several early extractive and non-inclusive societies were long lasting. 
This is at odds with the theories of some contemporary development economists.  
 
Keywords: Institutional economics, Malthusian trap, Neolithic development, population 
dynamics, social inequality and development  
JEL Codes: O1, P4, N00 
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The Malthusian Trap and Development in Pre-Industrial Societies: A View 
Differing from the Standard One 
1. Introduction 
It is generally recognised that two major economic revolutions resulted in substantial 
increases in the global population of human beings. These were the commencement of 
agriculture in the Neolithic period which subsequently was able to support significant urban 
settlements and much later, the Industrial Revolution (Childe, 1936 [1965], 1950). In fact, the 
development of urban settlements reliant on agriculture is seen by many writers as heralding 
the commencement of civilisation and as being the basis for subsequent intellectual and 
cultural advances by humankind. In addition, in many pre-industrial societies, significant 
economic innovations occurred and major public works were completed. It is unlikely that 
this type of economic progress would have been achieved if the whole of the population was 
subject to Malthus’ theory of population dynamics. How then can development in pre-
industrial economic societies be explained? The purpose of this article is to present a simple 
theory of how this was possible.  
Several influential economists (for example, Clark, 2007) have recently provided support for 
Malthus’ theory of population dynamics. Clark (2007, p. 1) states that before 1800, there was 
no upward trend in income per person and that because of the Malthusian trap, short-term 
gains in income as a result of technological advances were inevitably lost due to population 
growth. While this seems to have been true for the masses, because of the mechanisms 
outlined in this article, it did not prevent continuing technological progress and capital 
accumulation (features of economic development) in some preindustrial societies. 
Furthermore, Ashraf and Galor (2011) paint a dismal picture of preindustrial societies and 
provide statistics which indicate that the average per capita level of income in these societies 
remained at subsistence level, despite the occurrence of some technological progress. Galor 
(2005) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) elaborate on the well-known view that the Industrial 
Revolution represents a great divide in the process of economic development. Not only did it 
eventually result in demographic transition but it was also associated with increased equality 
of income. 
Galor (2005) contends that inequality of income was a significant impediment to economic 
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development in agrarian societies. Moreover, Galor et al. (2009), also express this view in 
relation to more recent historical events. Contrary to this view, we contend that income 
inequality was essential (but not sufficient) for economic development in preindustrial 
societies. 
Many scholars assume, as Galor (2005) did, that the thesis that inequality promoted 
accumulation and economic growth is not supported by historical evidence. They consider 
that substantial economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen income gaps through rent 
seeking and rent keeping, forces that can demonstrably retard economic growth. However, we 
argue that this thesis needs modification. 
Furthermore, the thesis that the bulk of the population in agrarian societies lived at 
subsistence level has not gone unquestioned. See for example Maddison (2007). However, in 
developing the following theory, it is accepted that the bulk of the population in agrarian 
societies was subject to Malthusian like population dynamics and lived approximately at 
subsistence level.  
We argue that some such societies were able to achieve significant investment in capital 
works and the advancement of knowledge because a large proportion of the economic surplus 
was appropriated by a relatively small dominant class and that the size of the population of 
this class was constrained. The appropriation of the economic surplus produced by the 
dominated class, limited the growth or the size of their population. Otherwise, the growth in 
the population of the dominated class would have completely dissipated the potential 
available economic surplus, given the Malthusian theory of population growth. This view is 
consistent with that expressed by Brenner (1976). 
This article is set out as follows. First the theory of the extraction of the economic surplus and 
its consequences for population growth and development are outlined. Then it is shown how, 
given this extraction, the dominant class could gain from capital accumulation and support for 
knowledge creation. Factors that helped to limit the size of the dominant class are 
subsequently considered and paying particular attention to the urban revolution, a general 
discussion of social inequality and development in preindustrial agrarian societies follows. 
  
4 
 
2. Demographic and Economic Consequences of the Extraction of the Economic 
Surplus by the Dominant Class 
Extraction of the economic surplus in agrarian societies by the dominant class provided the 
means for capital accumulation (including additions to human capital), for their defence and 
for consumption by the elite. The long run fate of such societies was influenced by the 
balance it was able to achieve between the potential uses of the economic surplus. Defence 
expenditure and extravagant consumption by the elite would reduce the surplus available for 
capital accumulation. In some cases, some agrarian societies may have been in the unfortunate 
position having to allocate most of their economic surplus to defence in order to survive, and 
even then, some may have been unable to prevent foreign invasion. In any case, it is clear that 
the dominant class had a strong economic interest in appropriating the economic surplus 
generated by the dominated. 
The simple type of economic relationships involved can be illustrated by Figure 1.1In this 
model, the level of the agricultural output Y, of a society is assumed to depend on the level of 
the population of the dominated class, X. Given the existing technology and capital, the 
marginal productivity of the dominated class is indicated by line ADE and line ABC as its 
average productivity. Assume that the subsistence level of income is OS per head. Then in the 
absence of any appropriation of the surplus by the dominating class, the equilibrium 
population of the dominated will be X3, given Malthus’ theory. The economic surplus is 
entirely dissipated in this case. Suppose, however, that the dominant class imposes a levy of 
ST per head on the dominated. The equilibrium level of population of the dominated class is 
now X1(this is much smaller than if an egalitarian system of distributing output existed) and 
an economic surplus equivalent to the area of the hatched rectangle SDVT is appropriated. 
Total agricultural output is equal to the area of rectangle OLVT. 
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Figure 1: An illustration that the dominant class by appropriating the economic 
surplus generated by the dominated class prevents the dissipation of this 
surplus. 
 
Note that we do not specify the dynamics by which the dominated population adjusts its level 
of population in relation to the availability of income. Stability, however, requires that not all 
members of this population be equally vulnerable to a reduction in income of this population 
when all are already at subsistence level (Tisdell, 2013, pp. 141-150). In practice, members of 
this population could have differences in their ability to access income when it becomes 
scarcer or may vary in their fitness, that is their ability to temporarily survive food 
deprivation. In their dynamic model, Ashraf and Galor (2011) make variations in the numbers 
of surviving children the adjustment variable. However, adjustment mechanisms to the 
population (if it decreases) could also include the death of less fit (such as the elderly) and 
those who have been excluded by ‘stronger’ persons from adequate access to food in times of 
shortage.  
The development of agrarian societies depends, as was mentioned above, on the use which the 
dominating class makes of the appropriated economic surplus. After meeting its military 
requirements and satisfying its consumption, the remaining sum can be invested by the ruling 
class to increase the amount of the surplus the ruling class can appropriate in the future. This 
is assuming that its investments are productive.  
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Milanovic et al. (2007) provide some empirical evidence of the magnitude of the extraction 
ratio in some preindustrial societies. They infer the extent of economic inequality for 14 
preindustrial societies, stretching from the Roman Empire 14 AD, to the Byzantium in 1000, 
to England in 1688, to Nueva España around 1790, to China in 1880 and to British India in 
1947. One of their results(2007, p. 28) is that the extraction ratio – how much of potential 
inequality was converted into actual inequality – was significantly higher in preindustrial 
times than now. The ratio shows how powerful and extortionary were the elite, its institutions, 
and its policies. However, their paper focuses on measuring inequality in preindustrial 
societies, and does not explore the social structure underpinning inequality nor its 
determinants. 
3. The Incentive of the Dominant Class to Undertake Investment 
The scope which the dominant class has to increase its economic surplus is illustrated by the 
example in Figure 2. As before, OS is the subsistence level of income of the dominated class 
and the line marked ADE shows its initial marginal productivity relationship. As a result of 
investing some of its economic surplus, the dominant class is assumed to increase the 
marginal productivity of the dominated group. This may result in the marginal productivity 
relationship moving up to the line HJK. The maximum economic surplus available to the 
dominant class now increases by an amount equivalent to the dotted trapezium ADJH. 
Originally, this surplus was equivalent to the hatched area shown. If the maximum amount of 
economic surplus is appropriated by the dominant class, the population of the dominated 
group increases from X1 to X2 following investment from the economic surplus. However, the 
level of income of the dominated remains at the subsistence level. They gain no economic 
advantage. The only group that has an economic gain is the dominant class. Total agricultural 
output rises from an area equivalent to the area of quadrilateral OLDA to that equivalent to 
the area of quadrilateral OMJH.  
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Figure 2: A case in which investment of at least some of the economic surplus adds to 
the economic surplus and results in an increased population of the 
dominated group.  
 
The dominant class is unlikely to know the exact amount it should levy on the dominated to 
appropriate the maximum amount of the economic surplus. Nevertheless, even if it only 
approximates this levy, the same general consequences follow. 
Note that the above theory seems to be at odds with Childe’s (1936 [1965], pp. 230-231) 
assertion that the rulers who emerged after the urban revolution had few incentives to 
encourage invention. He bases this thesis on the view that these rulers ‘now commended 
almost unlimited reserves of labour recruited from subjects fired with superstitious faith and 
captives taken in war; they had no need to bother about labour saving inventions’ (Childe, 
1936 [1965], p. 231). However, as the above theory demonstrates, these rulers could gain 
substantially by increasing the productivity of labour. Nevertheless, in some cases, they may 
not have chosen to do this or they may have been too constrained by necessary expenditure in 
defence to have funds left to do this. 
It might be contended that the example given in Figure 2 does not adequately take account of 
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Childe’s viewpoint because the result of the productivity increase depicted is to increase the 
demand for labour. However, suppose that the marginal productivity curve of labour after a 
productivity enhancing event is much steeper than illustrated but starts at point H and passes 
through a point near the left hand side of D. The total demand for labour declines in this case 
but the economic surplus rises. If all the ruling class wants to do is to raise its economic 
surplus, it would not be concerned by whether this increases or decreases the employment and 
population of the dominated class.  
4. Mechanisms Limiting the Size of the Ruling Class 
The above theory depends on the size of the population of the ruling class not being 
determined by the population principle of Malthus but on its being limited. In fact, if this class 
were to increase in proportion to its means of subsistence, it would have no surplus left to 
retain its dominance. Its position in all probability would be usurped by outsiders. The 
mechanisms which are limiting the size of the ruling class can be either endogenously decided 
by the elite (for example, the principle of primogeniture or forced exclusion) or can be the 
result of exogenous events (for example, as the result of invasions, or internal conflict and 
warfare).The size of the dominant class was also limited on occasions by rivalry among its 
members and by usurpers.  
Furthermore, following the conquest of a society by a foreign power, the conquerors mostly 
replaced the pre-existing dominant class by their own which in many cases, was smaller in 
number. This happened, for example, several times in the case of China. In northern and 
central China, the Western Chou, who had been powerful in the Shaanxi province (along the 
upper Wei River) as the western neighbours of the Shang, defeated the Shang and dominated 
the region from 1122 to 771 BC. In the Common Era, for example, Kublai Khan following the 
successful invasion of China by the Mongols established the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) with 
his Mongol followers as the ruling class in China. Similarly, the invading Manchus 
established the Qing Dynasty in China (1644-1912). 
It was not only by invaders that the size of the ruling class could be reduced from time to time 
by other means also, including internal rebellion. One such process has been described by 
Gascoigne in relation to China as follows: 
‘A new dynasty begins with a clean slate. It has few commitments, and its prestige or strength 
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is sufficient for it to gather more than adequate funds for its immediate needs. With the 
passage of time the imperial family grows larger and greedier, the official classes become 
used to luxury and, being themselves the bureaucrats, tend to shift the tax burdens from their 
own shoulders onto someone else’s (in later dynasties the mandarin class was officially 
exempt from tax). Ever increasing demands fall, ultimately, on the one group of people 
without influence, the peasants. When the system has deteriorated so far as to be intolerable, 
the peasants finally rise in rebellion.’ (Gascoigne, 2004, p. 70) 
However, these revolts often enabled other members of the elite to overthrow the top echelons 
of the ruling class. This happened on several occasions during the period of the Han Dynasty 
(206 BC – AD 220) in China. On one occasion, the very generals charged with putting an end 
to a peasant rebellion took advantage of the situation to establish themselves as the rulers 
(Gascoigne, 2004, p. 72). 
5. Discussion of the Above Development Theory 
Opinions differ about whether the type of social inequality which developed after the 
commencement of agriculture in the Neolithic period and which continued (with variations) 
until after the Industrial Revolution, retarded or promoted economic development. Galor 
(2005) argues that such inequality was unfavourable to economic development. However, that 
view depends on how one judges the presence or absence of development. If it is judged by 
increases in the per capita income of the bulk of the population and the extent of their 
freedom, one could conclude that no development occurred. However, if one considers the 
extent of advances in knowledge, improvements in production technologies, in the 
organisation of societies, the extension of economic exchange and the provision of 
infrastructure during this long preindustrial period, one cannot fail but to be impressed by the 
amount of development of human civilisation which occurred. It is doubtful whether an 
egalitarian system (even if it could have survived given the structural change brought about 
by the development of agriculture) would have been able to achieve similar results. In fact, 
given Malthus’ theory of population dynamics, the above theory demonstrates the 
impossibility of economic development. It is possible that in hunter gatherer societies, the 
Malthusian theory of population growth did not hold because of the presence of social and 
practical limitations on size of families. However, these constraints disappeared in agrarian 
societies (Childe, 1936 [1965]). What is more likely to have happened is that income 
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inequality must have risen as hunter gathers slowly evolved into ancient agricultural 
settlements with surpluses above subsistence2. Inequality rose further as economic 
development in these early agricultural settlements gave the elite the opportunity to harvest 
those rising surpluses. 
The above theory only shows that a potential existed for development given the type of social 
inequality present in many agrarian societies for several millennia. In some such societies, this 
economic surplus was harnessed for economic development but not in all, either by choice of 
the rulers and by their need to use their surplus to stave off external aggression. Furthermore, 
the size of the economic surplus available for development may have varied historically in 
agrarian preindustrial societies. With the passage of time, the social system may have become 
ossified and bogged down in armed conflict and burdened by superstitions and social rules of 
conduct, thereby retarding the scope for further progress.  
Childe (1936 [1965], Chapter 9) argues that this was the case. In Chapter 6 (1936 [1965]), 
Childe describes how the priestly class and the rulers of early agrarian societies (such as that 
of Sumer and Egypt) promoted capital accumulation and in Chapter 7, he specifies the way in 
which knowledge increased in such increasingly urbanised societies. He attributes increased 
knowledge as largely a response to the challenges of administering societies which had 
increased in their economic interdependence and in the scale of their economic activities. 
Childe states that  
‘the divine pharaoh [of early Egypt] did not earn obedience by conferring on his subjects only 
fictitious blessings. His authority was consolidated by tangible economic benefits conferred 
upon his kingdom. Like the unsubstantial duties of Mesopotamia, this substantial god divested 
part of his power and wealth to the material prosperity of his kingdom, a share of his 
resources was invested in genuinely reproductive undertakings. A pharaoh of Dynasty II is 
represented ‘cutting the first rod’ of a new irrigation canal. Operation instituted by the king 
for the control of flood waters are mentioned.’ (Childe, 1936 [1965], pp. 159-160) 
Childe continued to produce further examples such as the advance in knowledge motivated by 
administrative ends and the role of rulers in promoting foreign trade. 
In Chapter 9, however, Childe (1936 [1965]) provides a rather different perspective which (to 
some extent) is at odds with his exposition in Chapter 7. He claims that in the two millennia 
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preceding 3000 BC, many important discoveries were made (in the often claimed cradle of 
Western civilisation in West Asia and the Mediterranean region) which contributed to human 
advancement, but from about 2600 to 600 BC, ‘few contributions of comparable importance 
for human progress were made.’ 
The urban revolution (which evolved in those parts of the globe where suitable developments 
in agriculture occurred and which, as pointed out by Childe (1950) was facilitated by 
complementary circumstances) amplified class division in agrarian economies. Somewhat 
contrary to his position outlined in Chapter 6, Childe argues in Chapter 9 that this increased 
class division retarded economic progress (Childe, 1936 [1965]). He claims that the bulk of 
productive inventions prior to the urban revolution were made by actual producers. After the 
urban revolution, actual producers were relegated to the dominated class, and they could not 
escape from the lower class by technical improvement ‘that the ruling class could hardly 
appreciate’. Their best hope was to join the middle class in supporting ‘the established 
church’ (Childe, 1936 [1965], p. 231). This was a recipe for the retardation of the progress of 
mankind. He concludes: ‘Thus, from the point of view of progress, Egyptian and Babylonian 
societies were involved by the urban revolution in a hopeless contradiction. And they 
bequeathed the contradiction to various successor states – Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, 
Macedonians – that took them as models’ (Childe, 1936 [1965], p. 231). 
One is left with a quandary. Is the positive view given in Chapter 6 of Childe (1936 
[1965])about the role of the urban revolution in fostering development more accurate than his 
negative version in Chapter 9 of the consequences of this revolution for human progress?3 
Adding to this confusion, Childe (1950) provides an insightful analysis of the conditions 
required for the development of urban centres and portrays their positive contributions to 
development. In any case, it is not true that all societies showed lack of economic 
development following their increased urbanisation. For example, early Chinese societies 
continued to develop even though before the end of the Qing Dynasty, signs of economic 
stagnation were apparent. Furthermore, in the West, the administrative structures of nation 
states experienced substantial change. Many nation states disintegrated into localised 
fiefdoms. In Europe this disintegration was prevalent in the Medieval period and much of 
Europe’s infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) fell into a serious state of disrepair (Bloch, 
1962, Ch. 4). Strong divisive forces developed which retarded economic progress. 
Nevertheless, not all accumulated knowledge and wealth was lost in this period, and the 
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economic functions of the urban based middle class expanded (Bloch, 1962, Ch. 4) and 
eventually would provide a springboard for the commencement of the Industrial Revolution. 
6. The Pivotal Role of Urban Centres in Development: Illustrations and Analysis 
The above theory of the appropriation of the agricultural surplus by a ruling elite needs to be 
extended by relating it specifically to the development of urban centres (cities). The mere fact 
that agriculture eventually was able to yield a food surplus did not in itself support the 
development of civilisations. It was necessary for the ruling elite to be able to marshal this 
surplus and transport it to central places, namely cities (Smith, 2003). This required the 
surplus to be sizeable in total, easily transportable, and storable. Grains (such as wheat, rice, 
millet, maize and the seeds of some legumes) were suited to this purpose. It is therefore, not 
surprising that early civilisations with important cities developed in areas where these 
commodities were available, for example, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, India and parts of 
the Americas. Such commodities were able to support cities and provided the dominant class 
with a surplus which it could allocate to various uses, such as capital accumulation, defence 
and the waging of war, its own consumption and knowledge accumulation and transmission. 
The scope which early societies had for benefitting from agriculture depended significantly on 
their available initial resource endowments, for example, the availability of wild species 
suitable for domestication, their climatic conditions, the scope for navigation and the ease of 
transport of produce (Diamond, 1997, Ch. 5). Localities close to the sea or rivers were at an 
advantage in early times because it was usually least costly and quicker to transport produce 
by boat than by land. 
Even when agriculture developed in very early times, this did not always result in the 
development of cities nor significant social stratification. For example, it is believed that 
agriculture developed in New Guinea around 7,000 BCE (Renfrew, 2007, p. 210) but no 
major cities developed there and Melanesian societies appear not to have become socially 
stratified. This could be due to a combination of factors. Agriculture in New Guinea did not 
produce grains but mostly tubers and bananas (plantains) both of which are more perishable 
than grains. Transport (because of the terrain) was also an obstacle and probably the food 
surplus produced by each household was not large. This situation was not favourable to the 
development of the type of stratified societies containing cities which developed in Eurasia, 
North Africa and parts of the Americas. 
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In prehistory and early history, it is likely that both resource endowments and institutions 
were important for development but to some extent, because resource endowments influenced 
the nature of agricultural commodities produced, this determined the nature of the social 
institutions which evolved, for example, whether or not a society was socially stratified. In 
recent times, many economists for example, following North (1990) and North and Thomas 
(1976) have portrayed institutional structures as being of greater importance as an influence 
on economic development than resource endowments. In fact, the influential economists D. 
Acemoglu and J. Robinson state that:  
‘Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be 
inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become 
impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic 
institutions supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic 
growth.’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 97) 
While this statement might be correct, one ought to be sceptical about it. First, it is not clear 
how much choice societies have about their institutions. To a considerable extent, they may 
be determined by evolutionary forces over which individual societies have little control. 
Secondly, historical evidence also indicates that nations do not always fail quickly when they 
have extractive institutions. For example, Sumerian civilisation lasted for more than 1,500 
years, that of ancient Egypt for over 2,000 years and arguably, that of China also for over two 
millennia, and many other early civilisations including that of the Romans, those of the 
Mayans and the Incas lasted for several hundreds of years (Haywood, 2010). Whether or not 
any of today’s nations having more inclusive societies will last for several millennia is not at 
all clear.  
Urban centres (cities) played a significant role in the development of preindustrial societies 
which relied on extractive institutions for their development. Cities were crucial in the 
development process because they allowed wealth and power, to be amassed and they enabled 
the rapid exchange of ideas among relatively large numbers of people, thereby encouraging 
intellectual thought and artistic expression. Cities also promoted specialisation in 
manufacturing and trade and fostered the emergence of centres of political power (Baker, et 
al., 2010). In cities, as settlements grew so large that not everyone knew each other, residents 
could no longer rely on family and village leaders to settle disputes or to decide issues for the 
whole community. Large societies hence developed governments, often starting with a single 
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strong leader who, as the need arose, empowered others to assist him. Over time the result 
was the introduction of a government and its associated administration, that is, an array of 
officials who carried out decisions, maintained order, organised food reserves, supervised 
construction projects, and resolved conflicts among strangers. A government’s main functions 
were to secure the society’s sustenance, ensure the survival of its ruling elite, and defend 
against outsiders. The connection between Bronze Age urbanisation and the political 
development of states and emergence of ruling elites is supported by considerable evidence. 
Urbanisation is connected with the development of new crafts and craft skills (for example, 
metallurgy), that is, with specialisation, and also with institutions that coordinated multiple 
production activities and infrastructure. This is why, since Gordon Childe (1936), scholars 
have used the term ‘Urban Revolution’ for this transformation. 
Urbanisation, Labour Specialisation and Coordination 
Even in ancient history societies, urbanisation changed the nature and the consequences of 
settlement. The city is not just a denser and larger settlement than the villages that support it 
with food and fuel. It is also a social entity where people are linked together not by the ties of 
kinship as in tribal society, but by interdependence and functional complementarity. Although 
towns and cities depended on farming, their most influential inhabitants were those who did 
not farm (Wailes, 1996). With their food supplied by farmers, these people could specialise in 
other occupations. Indeed, city life and clustering makes sense only when there are several 
persons engaged in diverse non-food producing occupations such as metallurgy, stone 
carving, administration, serving the temples, and trade. Producers of non-subsistence goods 
were largely dependants of the rulers or temples. The more specialisation there was, the more 
the individual depended on supra household organisation mechanisms and less on face to face 
community ties. Instead of being a total of so many tribes and clans, the city was a population 
held together by regulation and coordination. The elite ensured not only law and order, but the 
administrative structure on which the division of labour could be organised. The ruling elite 
demanded the labour of the urban populace, if not token tribute as well. An overarching 
administrative and regulatory structure such as this ran on systems of recording (writing) and 
calendar keeping. This is why there is a logical connection between the coming of cities and 
the existence of states or societies ruled by elites. 
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Metallurgy 
The development of metallurgy marks a shift from simple to advanced agrarian societies and 
it highlights the role of the elite in economic development. Even if metallurgy appeared 
during the Neolithic period, the Bronze Age represents a true leap forward in technology of 
metal work, and therefore of other crafts using metal tools. Most important is a point 
emphasised by Gordon Childe: these items were produced for the urban elite rather than the 
populace. Metallurgy came into its own when specialists produced objects for royal ancestor 
rituals as in China, or tools for urban workshops of the Mesopotamian temple and palace 
establishments, or for mortuary cults as in Egypt. Not only were such institutions a source of 
sustained demand, but the infrastructure, such as fuel, raw material and the day to day needs 
of metallurgists, could be provided. The social context of such technological development 
was the emerging division of labour and specialisation, and also demand from ruling elites 
and their productive establishments. Hence, the implications of metallurgy were fully realised 
only with the coming of states and/or cities.  
Infrastructure 
Urbanism is possible only when the land has a capacity to support a large number of people 
per unit area: for it entails the clustering of people in dense settlements, rather than an even 
dispersal across the landscape. Also necessary are technologies that make feasible the 
transport of bulky food grain to the non-farming populations of urban nodes. In ancient 
history, infrastructure consisted mainly of roads (Lay, 1992) and canals, the latter were used 
for transportation or for irrigation(Rodda and Ubertini, 2004). The first paved streets appear to 
have been built in Ur in 4000 BC. In 500 BCE, Darius I the Great started an extensive road 
system in Persia while, as it is well known, Romans built an extensive road system with the 
rise of the Roman Empire.  
It has long been noted that early cities and states all arose in river valleys in semiarid regions4. 
Thus it can be held that such environments prompted the formation of states, since the latter 
were probably created to organise vast numbers of people to build banks and dikes for flood 
control and irrigation systems to bring river water to farm fields. The oldest known canals 
were built in Mesopotamia 4000 BC. In Egypt, canals date back to at least 2300 BC, when a 
canal was built to bypass the cataract on the Nile near Aswan. In ancient China, large canals 
for river transport were established as far back as the Warring States (481-221 BC). By far the 
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longest canal was the grand canal of China completed in 609 CE, still the longest canal in the 
world today at 1,794 kilometres.  
A few advanced cities had aqueducts that serviced public fountains and baths. There is also 
the evidence that Harappan urban centres provided a street drainage system and other civic 
infrastructures. Street drainage functions only as a planned whole. Individual households 
cannot organise it piecemeal and therefore, this system appears to have been the outcome of 
elite regulation and coordination. 
Trade 
There is a marked correlation between the period of state emergence and an expansion of 
trade, in Egypt, Sumer, and South Asia. This trade expansion is, to a large extent, explained 
by activity undertaken by the elite. In addition to special privileges over land, water sources, 
mines, or pastures, the members of the elite assumed a sacral role, distinguishing themselves 
from the rest of the populace by ostentatious consumption (of metal work, exotic stone beads, 
shell carvings, etc.) and feigned mysterious powers. Thus, there were imperatives to organise 
the imports of high status cum utilitarian things. It also appears that the procurement of metals 
and semiprecious stones from afar for the elite created a need for ever larger quantities of 
them. During the Bronze Age and from the elite’s point of view, the development of centres 
of civilisation generated in them the need to acquire their own bronze weaponry to defend 
themselves or to organise the mass casting of weapons for military expeditions and conquests. 
We may probably claim that the more successful a ruler was in procuring copper and the 
alloying metals, the more military success he would have. Therefore, economies utilising 
bronze tools of production and bronze weapons were doomed to be dependent on elite 
organisation of external trade (especially to obtain tin which was very scarce) and local 
production.  
Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that trade in preindustrial societies was only for the 
purpose of providing prestige products for the ruling class and metals for war and defence 
(Chapman, 2008). For example, the economy of the Inca Empire (1000-1533 CE) relied on 
trade between different climatic zones of the Andes to stabilise its food supplies and its rulers 
built an extensive road system to facilitate this trade. They also developed irrigation in some 
of its arid areas. According to Haywood (2010, p.211), ‘the products of the different 
environmental zones were exchanged vertically between communities’ and this ‘provided 
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considerable insurance against the failure of any individual crop’. The Inca rulers also 
constructed large storehouses of food to be drawn on in times of need. 
In the Old World, it is possible that with the development of the Iron Age, the ruling elites 
concentrated more on waging war to fill their coffers and less on increasing domestic 
production and expanding peaceful external trade to extract a greater amount of economic 
surplus. To an increasing extent, they lived off their subject populations, acquiring booty, 
enslaved labour, captive artisans, and relied on regular flows of tribute. This undoubtedly 
retarded economic development. 
Defence and Conquest 
By 7000 BCE, as food supplies increased, some West Asian settlements grew quite large. 
Jericho in Palestine and Çatal Hüyük in what is now Turkey, for example, developed into 
towns - large settlements, housing several thousand people that served not only as residential 
centres but also as trading hubs. By the fourth millennium BCE, near the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers in West Asia and the Nile in northeast Africa, some towns grew into cities. These were 
very large, complex, densely populated settlements in which many people engaged in 
occupations other than farming. At these sites, excavations reflect the emergence of organised 
religion and give the impression that rulers exercised great power. Fortifications and weapons 
found in early cities suggest that they must have had numerous labourers to build the walls 
and watchtowers, soldiers to defend against outsiders, and governing officials with the 
authority to organise and supervise large groups of workers and warriors (Gat, 2006, pp. 167-
173). 
From around 1800 BCE onwards, a new type of state, which may loosely be referred to as an 
empire, began to emerge, initially in West Asia5. As a type of state the empire encompassed a 
fairly large territory which was not confined to a given geographical zone. It was usually, 
though not always, monarchical; had extensive military resources and was based on the 
collection of a large amount of tribute. Every empire had a core area as its political centre, and 
the ruling class of the empire belonged overwhelmingly to this core area. It was through 
conquest that the ruling elite of an area could establish its domination over other areas. The 
sheer logic of empire building necessitated the mobilisation of a large well trained army and 
resources to sustain such an army. Thus empire building, appropriation of large surpluses in 
the form of tribute, and maintaining huge armies were all closely interlinked. 
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Knowledge Accumulation and Transmission 
Knowledge is partly conceived as the increasing capacity of an individual, a group, or a 
society to solve problems and to mentally anticipate the necessary actions. Knowledge was in 
early societies particularly tied to the management of the economy. Hyman and Renn point 
out: 
‘Sociocultural evolution inherently involves knowledge that is efficacious, either with respect 
to the physical world or with respect to the social world. […] this knowledge economy was 
almost completely tied to the underlying economy of labor. For example, literacy was closely 
correlated with socioeconomic status, and in Babylonia astronomical knowledge was pursued 
for agricultural and legitimatory ends, so that the pursuit of astronomical knowledge was 
ultimately motivated by economic concerns’. (Hyman and Renn, 2012, p. 95) 
In early societies, a priestly class was supported by the elite and in part was responsible for 
the advancement of knowledge. Beyond the creation of knowledge, it is also necessary to 
consider knowledge as something that may be shared by members of a profession, a social 
class, a geographic region or even an entire civilisation. Shared knowledge is especially 
important to the artistic, religious, legal and economic systems that constitute cultures; and 
knowledge travels along with artefacts and artistic styles, myths and rituals, laws and norms, 
goods and wealth. This distribution is facilitated by external representations of knowledge 
such as spoken language, writing and technological artefacts. Spoken language6 has always 
constituted one of the chief means of transmitting knowledge, and language spreads with 
migration, conquest and trade. 
However, the invention of writing7 created a new and powerful tool for the transmission of 
knowledge since it enabled knowledge to travel, in both time and space, beyond the 
immediacy of the speech situation. The invention of writing in Mesopotamia was originally a 
consequence of state administration. With writing came metrologies, calculation techniques, 
and finally, the rise of the first sciences, which may thus be conceived as resulting from a 
reflection on the social processes of organising labour. Trade and the exchange of goods on a 
larger scale were also developed, accompanied by written contracts, agreements and 
systematic and regulated forms of communication, also developing into multilingual formats. 
Mathematics emerged in ancient Babylonia when the material means of organising human 
labour, such as accounting systems, became an object of intellectual exploration.  
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Religion was one of the most important conveyors of the globalisation of knowledge and of 
science in the period between antiquity and the early modern era. It has often been argued that 
knowledge travelled with rituals (and associated verbal recitations), specific geometrical and 
knowledge needed to construct ritual altars was transmitted. It is also true that in many 
agrarian societies, impressive temples, shrines and mausoleums were built. While these might 
not have been productive, they may have played an important part in the social cohesion of 
these early societies and their construction would have helped advance building skills. 
The accumulation and transmission of knowledge were largely contingent on the emergence 
of a social network that supported the production and dissemination of knowledge. Hubs in 
this network were typically flourishing trade or religious centres, or capital cities of large 
empires. Empires further facilitated the wide range diffusion of knowledge and, in particular, 
the integration of knowledge emerging from different hubs. 
An Observation from the Above 
In places in preindustrial societies where agriculture developed and had attributes that enabled 
it to support the growth of cities, this increased the power of the dominant class if it already 
existed or enabled it to emerge and become powerful. Cities facilitated the ability of this class 
to accumulate wealth by appropriating the agricultural surplus and as demonstrated, cities 
played (by varied means) an important role in adding to wealth and fostering development. 
Despite Childe’s (Childe, 1936) ambivalence about the role of cities in development, in the 
absence of cities, it seems likely that development of civilisations would have been much 
slower in preindustrial extractive societies than was in fact the case. Even though these 
societies were extractive and non-inclusive, many lasted for hundreds of years and did add to 
wealth, a result which seems to be a variance with the prediction of Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012, p. 97) that such societies are doomed to fail quickly. 
7. Concluding Comments 
It seems that many ancient agrarian societies faced an economic and social dilemma. If they 
became egalitarian, the increased economic surplus which the development of agriculture and 
urban settlements eventually made possible would have been frittered away by population 
increases and would have resulted in all living at subsistence level. Furthermore, in such 
circumstances, an insufficient surplus would have been available for defence purposes. In 
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these circumstances, social inequality was probably a more desirable alternative to equality 
from a long term development point of view.  
Given the theory outlined here, a small dominant or ruling class was able to extract an 
economic surplus from the large dominated class. This limited the expansion in the size of the 
population of the dominated group who, however, after appropriation of the surplus, 
continued to live at subsistence level. The appropriation of this surplus enabled the ruling 
class to provide for military expenditure and to engage in capital accumulation, as well 
extravagant consumption. The development of their society depended on the balance achieved 
between these allocations of the economic surplus. Some rulers were able to contribute 
substantially by capital accumulation and by the advancement of knowledge to increased 
economic production. On the other hand, some rulers squandered the economic surplus and 
this resulted ultimately in the demise of their societies. 
By modern standards, such a socioeconomic system might seem to be reprehensible but the 
alternative agrarian system involving equality would hardly have been more desirable, even if 
such societies could have survived external attacks. In the alternative egalitarian 
socioeconomic system, all would be doomed to live at subsistence level and no surplus would 
have been available for capital accumulation and for the advancement of knowledge. 
It is true, as pointed out by Childe (1950, p. 16), that in an agrarian system dominated by a 
small group ‘there seemed [to be] a glaring conflict on economic interests between the tiny 
ruling class, who amassed the bulk of the social surplus, and the vast majority who were left 
with a bare subsistence and effectively excluded from the spiritual benefits of civilisation’. It 
is, however, doubtful if the alternative of egalitarian distribution would have been superior 
from a development point of view. 
A socioeconomic system based on agriculture and inequality existed for many millennia, and 
was only replaced by a different system following the Industrial Revolution. It can be argued 
that success of the Industrial Revolution depended on developments which occurred in 
agrarian based economies following the commencement of agriculture in the Neolithic period, 
although it is possible that the commencement of the Industrial Revolution was eventually 
retarded by the inequality present in preindustrial societies. The new economic system 
following the Industrial Revolution transformed social structures, and eventually enabled the 
bulk of populations in many societies to exist at standards of living well above the subsistence 
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level. However, the long term environmental sustainability of economic growth based on the 
existing economic system has become a subject of increasing concern even though it has 
enabled a larger global population to exist at a high standard of living than ever before.  
8. Notes 
1. This is a similar diagram to that which has often been used to illustrate one of the 
misallocation consequences of open access to natural resources (see for example, Tisdell, 
2005, p. 136, Figure 6.1). 
2. Various calculations suggest that a hunter gatherer would need roughly four square 
kilometres of land to feed him in a year’s time while a very small chunk of land could 
support large number of agriculturists. 
3. Because Childe was a committed Marxist (Faulkener, 2007), he was probably reluctant to 
accept the possibility that economic inequality based on the exploitation of the masses 
could be associated with the development of civilisation. This may explain the 
discrepancy in his conclusions. 
4. In the fourth and third millennia BC, early cities, states, and civilisations arose near rivers 
in Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and China. 
5. Initially the Babylonian state in Mesopotamia and, somewhat later, the Hittite state in 
Anatolia were successful at bringing large territories under their control. 
6. Before 3000 BC, speakers of a Proto Indo European language began to spread throughout 
Eurasia. 
7. Writing appeared around 3300 BC in Mesopotamia; the largest group of texts is from 
Uruk. 
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